As I said at the conclusion of closing submissions at the Trial, I was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to make the four declarations I made orally on that occasion. Those declarations are repeated in [7] above.

I should explain my reasons for doing so in more detail, in view of the submissions which Lord Grabiner KC made on this topic on Day22.

On the basis that all the declarations sought by COPA were negative in nature, he referred me to the summary of the principles relevant to the grant of negative declaratory relief summarised by Cockerill J. in BNP Paribas SA v Trattamento Rifiuti Metropolitani SpA [2020] EWHC 2436 (Comm) at [78] which I set out, omitting citations:

‘i) The touchstone is utility;

ii)

The deployment of negative declarations should be scrutinised and their use rejected where it would serve no useful purpose;

iii)

The prime purpose is to do justice in the particular case;

iv)

The Court must consider whether the grant of declaratory relief is the most effective way of resolving the issues raised. In answering that question, the Court should consider what other options are available to resolve the issue;

v)

This emphasis on doing justice in the particular case is reflected in the limitations which are generally applied. Thus:

a)

The court will not entertain purely hypothetical questions. It will not pronounce upon legal situations which may arise, but generally upon those which have arisen.

b)

There must in general, be a real and present dispute between the parties before the court as to the existence or extent of a legal right between them.

c)

If the issue in dispute is not based on concrete facts the issue can still be treated as hypothetical. This can be characterised as “the missing element which makes a case hypothetical.”

vi)

Factors such as absence of positive evidence of utility and absence of concrete facts to ground the declarations may not be determinative; Zamir and Woolf note that the latter “can take different forms and can be lacking to differing degrees”. However, where there is such a lack in whole or in part the court will wish to be particularly alert to the dangers of producing something which is not only not utile, but may create confusion.’

Lord Grabiner KC stressed the points made at [78(v)] i.e. that the Court will grant declarations only to resolve real disputes relevant to the existence or extent of a legal right between the parties. He also relied on the passages cited below from the Judgment of O’Farrell J in Office Depot International (UK) Ltd v UBS Asset Management (UK) Ltd [2018] EWHC 1494 (TCC), [47], citing Lord Diplock in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435:

‘Declaratory relief will be granted only where there is a real dispute between the parties: Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435 per Lord Diplock at p.501:

“…The only kinds of rights with which courts of justice are concerned are legal rights; and a court of civil jurisdiction is concerned with legal rights only when the aid of the court is invoked by one party claiming a right against another party, to protect or enforce the right or to provide a remedy against that other party for infringement of it, or is invoked by either party to settle a dispute between them as to the existence or nature of the right claimed. So for the court to have jurisdiction to declare any legal right it must be one which is claimed by one of the parties as enforceable against an adverse party to the litigation, either as a subsisting right or as one which may come into existence in the future conditionally on the happening of an event …

… the jurisdiction of the court is not to declare the law generally or to give advisory opinions; it is confined to declaring contested legal rights, subsisting or future, of the parties represented in the litigation before it and not those of anyone else.”’

Based on these authorities, Lord Grabiner KC addressed the three declarations sought by COPA in their Particulars of Claim:

934.1.

First, the declaration that Dr Wright is not the author of the Bitcoin White Paper. He characterised this as answer to a purely academic question which did not engage any legal right or interest of COPA ‘not least because COPA does not claim to have authored the Bitcoin White Paper’.

934.2.

Second, the declaration that Dr Wright is not the owner of copyright in the Bitcoin White Paper. Lord Grabiner KC submitted this declaration would have no practical utility going beyond the consequences of a Judgment determining the Identity Issue against Dr Wright and would be wholly unnecessary.

934.3.

Third, a declaration that any use by COPA of the Bitcoin White Paper will not infringe any copyright owned by Dr Wright, which Lord Grabiner KC submitted would be entirely redundant.

934.4.

In his oral submissions, Lord Grabiner KC also addressed the declaration which would arise out of my formulation of the Identity Issue, namely that Dr Wright is or is not Satoshi Nakamoto. I understood him to submit that I could make a declaration in his favour: that Dr Wright is Satoshi Nakamoto, but that it was not seriously arguable that I could make a declaration to the opposite effect: that Dr Wright is not Satoshi Nakamoto.

In considering these submissions, the first point to note is that this case has changed somewhat since it was first pleaded. In particular, this Trial of the Identity Issue has been the trial of a preliminary issue in the BTC Core Claim where the Developers and various members of COPA are sued by Dr Wright and two of his companies for infringement of copyright in the Bitcoin White Paper – the key point being that a copy of the Bitcoin White Paper is in the Bitcoin Blockchain, which, as I understand matters, is reproduced by every node. Furthermore, it is appropriate to keep in mind that in the BTC Core claim, Dr Wright is claiming database right in various manifestations of the Bitcoin Blockchain and, furthermore, the Kraken and Coinbase Defendants (to the passing off claims made against them in those actions) have agreed to be bound by the outcome of this Trial, those actions being stayed in the meantime. In mentioning these matters I am not changing the issue which is the subject of this Trial. The debate here is over what declarations would have utility in the circumstances which now present themselves. In this regard, Mr Hough KC for COPA also reminded me of the various claims for defamation which Dr Wright has brought against various people who have said or implied he is not Satoshi.

Second, it is clear, in my judgment, that in these circumstances COPA does not need a competing claim to be the author of the Bitcoin White Paper for a declaration that Dr Wright is not the author of it to have utility or to remove it from the realm of academic questions.

Third, in view of the extremely unpleasant threats which Dr Wright has made in the past against some of the individual Developers in particular, I was minded to make declarations to ensure that Dr Wright would not have any possible basis on which to threaten them with copyrights or database rights stemming from the work done by Satoshi Nakamoto.

Fourth, I found Lord Grabiner KC’s submission to the effect that I should not grant any declaration to the effect that Dr Wright is not Satoshi Nakamoto (in the event that I so concluded) somewhat surprising, bearing in mind the huge effort and costs which have been expended on all three sides debating that very issue.

It was for those brief reasons that I very firmly concluded that the declarations I stated in open court on Day 22 (14 March 2024) had utility and were necessary to do justice between the parties.