The principles governing pleading and proof of fraud are well-established and are summarised by Arnold LJ in Sofer v Swissindependent Trustees SA [2020] EWCA Civ 699 at §§23 and 24:

“(i)

Fraud or dishonesty must be specifically alleged and sufficiently particularised, and will not be sufficiently particularised if the facts alleged are consistent with innocence: Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1.

(ii)

Dishonesty can be inferred from primary facts, provided that those primary facts are themselves pleaded. There must be some fact which tilts the balance and justifies an inference of dishonesty, and this fact must be pleaded: Three Rivers at [186] (Lord Millett).

(iii)

The claimant does not have to plead primary facts which are only consistent with dishonesty. The correct test is whether or not, on the basis of the primary facts pleaded, an inference of dishonesty is more likely than one of innocence or negligence: JSC Bank of Moscow v Kekhman [2015] EWHC 3073 (Comm) at [20]-[23] (Flaux J, as he then was).

(iv)

Particulars of dishonesty must be read as a whole and in context: Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902 at 944B (Sir Christopher Slade).

[24] To these principles there should be added the following general points about particulars:

(i)

The purpose of giving particulars is to allow the defendant to know the case he has to meet: Three Rivers at [185]-[186]; McPhilemy v Times Newspapers [1999] 3 All ER 775 at 793B (Lord Woolf MR).

(ii)

When giving particulars, no more than a concise statement of the facts relied upon is required: McPhilemy at 793B.

(iii)

Unless there is some obvious purpose in fighting over the terms of a pleading, contests over their terms are to be discouraged: McPhilemy at 793D.”

I was also reminded of the principles I summarised and applied back in October 2023, when allowing COPA to plead an additional 50 allegations of forgery: see [2023] EWHC 2642 (Ch) at [39]-[49].

In Dr Wright’s closing submissions, it was stressed on his behalf that:

‘…the forgery allegations are of the utmost seriousness and would, if established, do great damage to Dr Wright’s reputation and future endeavours. Although it was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 that there is only one civil standard of proof (the balance of probabilities), the courts have maintained that, in general, it is legitimate and conventional, and a fair starting point, that fraud and dishonesty are inherently improbable, such that cogent evidence is required for their proof; see Males LJ at [117] of Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2020] 4 WLR 55 and Teare J in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2013] EWHC 510 (Comm), at [76]).’

Overall, “pleading is not a game and it is about fairness and fairly understanding the case that has to be met, and points about whether a case has been adequately pleaded are to be looked at in that context”: see National Bank Trust v Yurov [2020] EWHC 100 (Comm) at §249 and the cases there cited.